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Foreword 
A traditional justification for  progressive taxation is that it imposes equal sa- 
crifice on all taxpayers in loss of utility. Nevertheless, many plausible utility 
functions yield strictly regressive taxes when all taxpayers sacrifice equally. If 
tax rates are required t o  be progressive, nonnegative, and independent of scale, 
then the re  is a unique family of positive, increasing, continuous utility functions 
that is consistent with equal rate of sacrifice. They determine a unique family of 
tax schedules that seem not to have been studied before except in isolated cases. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
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1. Introduction 
'? have not been able to  discover who w a s  the first to  proclaim the thesis that 
because the degree of utility of income decreases when income increases, it follows 
that equality of sacrifice entails progressive taxation". ([2], p. 48). So begins a 
learned paper by A.J. Cohen Stuart (1889) on the utilitarian foundations of pro- 
gressive taxation. Cohen Stuart points out that 'equal sacrifice' may be interpret- 
ed in two ways. Equal absolute sacrifice means that in paying taxes everyone 
gives up the same amount of utility relative to  his initial position. Equal rate of sa- 
crifice means that everyone gives up the s a m e  percentage in utility. Assuming tha t  
the marginal utility of income f a l l s  as income rises, it is clear that the r icher  must 
pay more in tax than the poorer if all are to  sacrifice equally by either criterion. 
It is not so  clear, however, that the r icher  must pay a higher percentage of their 
incomes in taxes to  achieve equality of sacrifice. In fact, for  many plausible utili- 
t y  functions this is not the  case. By itself, then, the equal sacrifice doctrine does 
not imply progressive taxation. 
Instead of attempting to justify progressive taxes by equal sacrifice, w e  may 
turn the  argument around: if a progressive (or flat) tax is deemed to  be the ap- 
propriate outcome of an equal sacrifice model, what implications does this have fo r  
the form of the utility function? More generally, might it be possible to deduae 
pertinent infomation about the utility function by examining the properties of the 
tax schedules that result from the equal sacrifice principle? The answer is affir- 
mative. We shall show that  three  simple properties of the tax system- 
* This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant SES-8319530 at the 
University of Maryland. 
nonnegativity, progressivity, and scale-invariance-are enough to completely 
determine the form of the  utility functions, whether equal absolute o r  equal rate of 
sacrifice is the criterion. In both cases, the implied family of tax schedules is the 
same. 
The study of formal properties of tax schedules has a long and distinguished 
tradition going back t o  the work of Cohen Stuart  [2], Edgeworth [3]. and others  
around the  turn of the  last century. This axiomatic point of view has recently been 
revived in the  work of W.F. Richter [9], [lo], Eichhorn and Funke [4], Eichhorn, 
Funke and Richter [5], and Pfaehler [?I, among others. It  differs substantially 
from the optimal tax l i terature (e.g., Mirrlees [6] )  in that  tax systems a r e  derived 
from elementary principles of equity and consistency, r a the r  than from cr i te r ia  of 
economic optimality . 
2. The equal sncrifice principle 
Let z represent  an individual's taxable income, and u (z) t he  utility of income 
level z. For purposes of this discussion, every individual is assumed to  have the  
s a m e  utility function fo r  income. W e  make the following regularity assumptions: 
u (z) is defined fo r  all z > 0. u (z) may o r  may not be bounded above o r  below. 
A t a z  schedule is a function t = J (z) defined fo r  all z > 0, where t is  the  tax 
paid on income z and 0 S J (z ) < z . That is, taxes are nonnegative and nonconfis- 
catory. J is progressive if, for  all z , J (z ) / z is monotone nondecreasing in z . J 
is s tr ic t ly  progressive if J (z) / z is strictly monotone increasing in z . Thus the 
flat tax P(z) = rz where 0 S r < 11 is progressive but not strictly so. 
Say that  J (z) induces equal sactipice if 
J (z ) induces an equal rate of sactipice if 
Note that,  since 0 S J (z) < z and u (z) is  strictly increasing, w e  must have 
c 2 0 in (1). Moreover, c > 0 unless J(z) is identically zero. For (2) t o  be well- 
defined, u (z ) # 0, and hence by continuity either u (z ) > 0 for  all z > 0, o r  
u(z) < 0 fo r  all z > 0. The former case is the more natural, and implies that  
0 S r < 1 i n  (2). 
O u r  goal is to gain more information about t he  form of the  utility functions in 
(1) and (2) by studying the  propert ies  of the  tax schedules tha t  they engender. W e  
have already required tha t  taxes be  nonnegative, i.e., tha t  t he re  be  no minimum in- 
come guarantee o r  o the r  form of d i rec t  subsidization through the  tax system. This , 
is a significant assumption, but accords with much cu r ren t  practice. Second, i t  
seems intuitively reasonable tha t  a tax schedule which metes out  equal sacrifice 
will be e i ther  progressive o r  flat, but not strictly regressive. In o the r  words, if a 
proposed measure of utility yields nonprogressive taxation, then w e  may suspect 
t ha t  it at tr ibutes  too grea t  a marginal value of income to t he  rich. 
Third, i t  seems reasonable tha t  tax rates should depend only on the  relative 
distribution of incomes, not on the  absolute monetary units in which incomes are 
measured. In o the r  words, if incomes all increase by a fixed percentage, so t ha t  
t he  relative distribution of incomes remains unchanged, and if t he  total tax burden 
increases by the  same percentage, then the  relative distribution of taxes should 
remain unchanged. Such a tax system is sca le inua t ian t .  Scale-invariance can be 
interpreted as a simple principle of distributive equity: if taxes and incomes all 
increase or decrease in some fixed proportion, then equity i s  preserved. I t  can 
also be  regarded as merely a pragmatic principle tha t  allows t h e  tax system t o  b e  
re-indexed without changing the  relative distribution of t he  tax burden. 
3. Utility functions and tax myatema consintent with absolute equality 
of - d i c e  
Let f ( z )  be  a tax schedule tha t  induces equal absolute sacrifice under t h e  
utility function u (z). Thus f and u satisfy (I),  o r  equivalently 
Note tha t  t he  inverse of u exists because u i s  assumed to be  strictly increas- 
ing. Expression (3) shows tha t  f can be  regarded as a function of two variables: 
t he  income level z and the  amount of sacrifice c .  As c varies, f ( z , c )  defines a 
family of tax schedules tha t  allows different amounts of tax to be raised relative 
to any fixed distribution of incomes. f ( z  , c ) is called a parametric t a z  schedule. 
Parametric families c rop  up in a wide variety of f a i r  division problems [Ill. 
Scale-invariance of t h e  tax system based on f ( z , c )  amounts t o  saying that ,  
fo r  every scale fac tor  A > 0, and f o r  every constant c Z 0 ,  t he re  exists a constant 
c' (depending on A) such tha t  
In o the r  words, the  tax schedule can be  re-inderad by changing c t o  c', and the  
proportion of tax  paid to income received will remain fixed f o r  a l l  persons. 
If j imposes absolute sacrifice and i s  scale-invariant then several  important 
propert ies  of the utility function may be  deduced. In particular,  differences in 
utility levels will be  preserved (in an ordinal sense) under a uniform change of 
scale. Consider two individuals, one with initial income r and after-tax income y , 
0 < y S r , and another  with initial income r ' and a f t e r  tax income y ', 0 < y ' S r '. 
Equal absolute sacr if ice  implies tha t  u (2)  - u (y  ) = u (2') - u (y  ') = c 2 0. By 
definition of J , y  = r - j ( r  , c )  and y ' = r '  - j  (r ' ,c) .  Since j i s  scale-invariant, 
f o r  every A > 0 t h e r e  i s  a c '  2 0 such tha t  
Ay = Xz - j ( X z , c f )  and Ay' = Xz' - j (Xz ' , c f )  . 
Hence by (3) 
That is, f o r  every z , r  ', y , y ' > 0 and every A > 0, 
Such a function u is said to b e  homogeneous in d m r e n c e s .  
Lemma. If u ( r  ) is continuous, nondecreasing, and homogeneous in differences, 
then u ( r  ) is  of form 
(i) u ( r )  = b  , o r  
(ii) u ( z ) = a . Z n z  + b ,  a > O  , o r  
(iii) u ( z ) = a z P  + b  , ap > O  . 
Proof.* If u (z ) is homogeneous in differences, then there  is a single-valued func- 
tion F such that f o r  all 0 < y r z and all X > 0, 
Since u is continuous, F is too. Let D = [u ( z )  -u(y):O < y r z j .  By con- 
tinuity, D is an interval of R + of form [O,m ) o r  [O,m ], where m > 0 unless u (z ) is 
constant, which is case (i) of the lemma. Suppose then that m > 0. If z ,z' 2 0 and 
z + z ' < m ,  then z + z t = u ( z ) - u ( y )  for  some z and y .  Since 
0 S z S u ( z )  - u ( y ) ,  wehave 
Thus by the continuity of u ( z )  there exists some w between z and y such that 
u(w) = u ( z )  - 2 ;  that  is z = u ( z )  -u(w). Hence also z'  = u(w) -u (y) .  This 
argument shows that  fo r  every X > 0, 
F(z +z',A)=F(z,X)+F(z',X) provided z , z ' 2O  and z + z t < m  . (6) 
Since F is continuous, F may be continuously extended so  that  (6) also holds when- 
ever z ,z' r 0 and z + z'  = m .  It  follows from [I] (Section 2.1.4, Theorem 3) that 
F(z,X) = c(X)z for  all 0 S z S m ,  all X > O  . 
Since u is nondecreasing, 
u(&) - u(Xy) = c(X)[u(z) - u(y)I  f o r  all =,'I/ > 0 . 
Fix y* > 0, and let d(X) = u (Ay*) - c(X)u (y*). Then 
u(&)  = c(A)u(z) + d(X) for  all z,X > 0. 
.- 
For all real numbers r define u*(r)  = u(ef ) ,  c*(r) = c(ef),  and d*(r)  = d(ef).  
Making the substitutions s = In X and t = In z ,  the preceding becomes 
By [I] (Section 3.1.3, Theorem 1) this, together with the continuity and monotonici- 
ty of u* , implies that  
*The proof o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  originated in collaboration with Janos Aceel during s pleasant dr ive  to -  
gether across  southern Germany in July, 1985. His contribution and helpful comments on the  
manuscript are  grateful ly  acknowledged. 
Therefore. 
It  should be remarked that,  if u ( z )  is assumed t o  be continuous, homogeneous 
in differences, and nonconstant  (instead of nondecreasing), then the  above argu- 
ment shows that  u must b e  of form (i) o r  (ii) with a # 0, o r  (iii) with ap f 0. 
Theorem. Let the  utility of income u ( z )  be  continuous and strictly increasing for  
all incomes z > 0, and let f ( z  ,c ) be a scale-invariant, progressive family of tax 
schedules that  induces an equal level of sacrifice c 2 0 for  all positive income lev- 
els. Then fo r  some fixed a , p  > 0 and all z > 0, 
f ( z r c ) = ( l  - e - I a ) z  and u ( z ) = a  Lnz + b , a  >O; (0 
Z f ( 2 . c )  = z - a n d u ( z ) = - c z z * + b ,  a , p > O  . (ii) [I +;ZP / a ll/P 
Proof: By the lemma, u ( z )  must be of the form aln z + b fo r  some a > 0 o r  
a x P  + b for  ap > 0. The case of constant u ( z )  is  ruled out since it is assumed 
he re  tha t  u ( z )  i s  strictly increasing. f ( z )  yields a constant level of sacrifice 
c r 0 if and only if 
If u ( z )  = aln a + b , (7) implies that  
which is case (i) of the theorem. If u ( z )  = a z P  + b  w e  have two possibilities: 
C-1: u ( z ) = a z P + b , a  > O , p  > O  . 
Then u - l ( y ) = [ ( y  - b ) / a l i / p ,  and ( 7 )  becomes f ( z , c ) = z -  
[ z P  - c / a l l / P .  This i s  not progressive for  c  > 0 ,  since f ( z , c ) / z  =1- 
[ 1  - c / z P a ] l / P  is strictly decreasing in z .  
Came2: U ( Z )  = a z P  + b ,  a < O , p  < O .  
Replace a by -a and p by p and write u ( z )  = --azv + b ,  where a > 0, 
p > 0, and b  i s  unrestricted. Then u - l ( y )  = [a / ( b  - y ) l l / p  and ( 7 )  becomes 
These schedules are progressive for  all c  2 0, and strictly so  for  c  > 0. 0 
Set a = I  and for  every p > O  define f p ( z , c )  = z  - z / ( l  + C Z P ) ~ / P .  Also, 
define f  o ( ~  ,C ) = ( 1  - e * ) z  for  all z > 0. These tax schedules form a single fami- 
ly with two parameters: p essentially determines the  progressivity of the schedule 
and fo r  each fixed p , c  determines the amount of tax t o  be levied. 
4. Utility fundions and tax systems consistent with an equal rate of 
acrif ice 
Consider now a utility function that induces an equal r a te  of sacrifice over all 
income levels. For this notion to  be well-defined, w e  must have u ( z )  # 0 fo r  all 
z > 0. That is, the utility of income must be everywhere positive o r  everywhere 
negative. The more natural case is the former, and there is no rea l  loss of gen- 
erality in assuming it, for  if u ( z )  is negative, increasing, and an equal rate of sa- 
crifice regime prevails, then i t  also prevails under I /  lu ( z ) l ,  which is  positive and 
increasing. 
Let u ( 2 )  be positive, continuous, and strictly increasing, and let f  (2) induce 
a conshnt  rate of sacrifice r ,  0 r r < 1 .  By definition, 
u ( z  -f ( 2 ) )  1  - = r  fo ra l l  z > O  . 
24 ( 2 )  
Thus 
Therefore the  arguments of the  preceding section apply, since f' ( z )  induces equal 
absolute sacrifice relative t o  the  transformed utility function In u  ( 2 ) .  I t  follows 
tha t  t he  only progressive and scale-invariant tax schedules tha t  are consistent 
with an equal rate of sacrifice are essentially the  same as those tha t  are con- 
sistent with equal absolute sacrifice. The difference between the  two cases is the 
required form of the utility function. There are two possibilities. One is t ha t  
In u ( z )  = a  In z + b ,  a >0, in which case U ( Z )  = @ z a  where a  > O  and 
B = e b  > 0. Then an equal rate of sacrifice at rate r  results from imposing the  flat  
tax t  = y ( z , r )  = [ I  - ( l - r ) l / a ] z .  \ 
The second possibility is tha t  In u  ( z )  = --az + 6 ,  where a ,  p > 0. Then 
u  ( z )  is of the  form 
An equal rate of sacrifice at r a t e  r  results from imposing the  tax 
- 
t  = f ' ( z , r ) = z  - z / ( l - [ I n ( l - r ) ]  z P / l / P .  These results a r e  summarized 
below. 
Corollary. Let utility of income u ( z )  be positive, continuous, and strictly in- 
creasing f o r  all incomes z > 0, and let y(z ,r ) be  a scale-invariant, progressive 
family of tax schedules that  induces a n  equal rate of sacrifice 0 S r  < 1 on all po- 
sitive incomes. Then 
z )  = [ I -  - r a z  and u ( z )  = @ z a ,  a ,  6 > O  , ( 9  
Z f ( z , r )  = z  - and u ( z )  = @e-* , a ,  B. P > 0 . (ii) [1  -[In (1 -r ) ] z P  / a  l l / P  
Cohen Stuart ,  who originated the  formal approach t o  equal sacrifice in taxa- 
tion. advocated the  use of a utility function of form u  ( z )  = aln z + b ,  a  > 0, to- 
ge ther  with equal rate of sacrifice as the  criterion. This gives r i s e  t o  tax 
schedules of the form 
where r ,  0 r r  < 1  is t he  rate of sacrifice. These functions are known as Cohen 
Stuart tazes. They were also mentioned as a possibility by Edgeworth, who pro- 
posed that  they might be  appropriate as a s u r h x  yoked onto some other h x  [3]. 
Let z* = e +la, which may be interpreted as the  "minimum subsistence" level of 
income. Then Cohen Stuart's utility and h x  functions may be  written as 
U ( Z )  = aln(z/zL) and t = z  -z*(z/z*)l9. 
Cohen Stuart  taxes do not satisfy the  conditions of the  foregoing theorem on 
several counts. First, the  rate of sacrifice is undefined when z = x * ,  i.e., when 
the zero level of utility is  reached. Second, when z < z*, taxes become negative. 
Third, and perhaps most  disturbing, the tax rates paid by individuals depend not 
only on the  relative distribution of incomes in society, but also on the  absolute lev- 
el  z* tha t  is  supposed to have zero utility. In other  words, a precise definition of 
what constitutes the subsistence level is  crucial to t he  validity of the scheme in 
equal sacrifice terms. 
5. Conclusion 
The equal sacrifice approach to progressive taxation is appealing in princi- 
ple. But i t  is  far f r o m  clear a pFiori what form the  utility function should take, or 
whether equal absolute or equal rate of sacrifice is the  most  appropriate cri- 
terion. One can gain insight into these questions by imposing elementary condi- 
tions on the  tax functions that  a r i se  f r o m  an equal sacrifice model. A s  w e  have 
seen, equal sacrifice plus nonnegativity, progressivity, and scale-invariance is 
consistent with only a very special class of utility functions. 
The flat tax implies equal absolute sacrifice if and only if utility is represent- 
ed by u (z ) = aln z + b for some a > 0, and implies equal rate of sacrifice if and 
only if utility is represented by u (z) = @za, a, @ > 0. A strictly progressive, 
nonnegative, and scale-invariant tax implies equal absolute sacrifice if and only if 
utility is represented by u (z) = -ax* + b ,  where a, p > 0. I t  implies equal rate 
of sacrifice if and only if utility is represented by u(z) =bee', where 
a, b ,  p > 0. The class -uz* + b is  bounded above and unbounded below, whereas 
the  class be-' is  positive, bounded both above and below, and u(z) -, 0 as 
z -, 0. Since a positive utility of income to be more sensible intuitively than one 
that  is unbounded below, i t  appears that  equal r a t e  of sacrifice seems to be the 
more natural criterion when w e  examine both the form of the utility functions and 
of the tax schedules that  are consistent with it. 
- 10 - 
Finally, there  is only one family of tax schedules that  is consistent with equal 
sacrifice under  either d e n i t i o n ,  and is nonnegative, progressive, and scale- 
invariant. This s a m e  family has another desirable feature: namely, a tax can be 
levied in successive installments with the  same outcome as if i t  had been levied all 
at once [12]. 
Schedules of the above type can be fit  quite closely to recent  tax schedules in 
the U.S. and in West Germany [12]. This fact suggests that  one could use actual tax 
data to estimate the value of p in formula (ii) of the Theorem (or the  Corollary). 
For recent  US and West German data, the estimated values of p are in the  vicinity 
of .65 to .75. If one hypothesizes that  tax schedules to some degree reflect what a 
given society perceives to be equal sacrifice, then such estimates might be  treated 
in turn as estimates of the  parameters in the utility functions themselves. 
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